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SUBJ: HILEX-6 CRITIQUE MESSAGES

SUMMARY. REVIEW OF HILEX-6 REVEALED SEVERAL SHORTCOMINGS IN US AND NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. AMONG THE MOST SIGNIFICANT WERE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MISSION AND WASHINGTON; LEVEL OF WASHINGTON PARTICIPATION; THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM PROCEDURES FOR EXCHANGING INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION, AND OTHER DATA WITHIN THE ALLIANCE; AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES UPON CHANGE IN ALERT STATUS OF US FORCES. MISSION ALSO PROVIDES COMMENT CONCERNING THE ROLE OF THE REINFORCED SCEPC IN A CRISIS/WAR SITUATION. MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOW IN SEPTELS ON COMMUNICATIONS AND ALERT SYSTEM. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS. END SUMMARY.

1. THIS MESSAGE DISCUSSES MISSION'S VIEW OF PROBLEMS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AS REVEALED BY EXERCISE HILEX-6. THESE PROBLEMS ARE DIVIDED INTO THREE CATEGORIES: THOSE ARISING BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND USNATO, THOSE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND NATO AUTHORITIES, AND THOSE WITHIN NATO.

2. WASHINGTON/USNATO PROBLEMS.

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A. THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THIS AREA WAS THE INADEQUATE CAPACITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT NOW IN USE BETWEEN USNATO AND WASHINGTON. SECURE VOICE (AUTOSEVOCOM-PRIORITY EUROPE; FLASH GLOBAL) PROVED TO BE LESS RELIABLE

THAN DESIRED DUE TO EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS AND TO THE PRE-EMPTION OF CALLS THROUGH THE USE OF HIGHER PRECEDENCE BY OTHER SUBSCRIBERS. MISSION ALSO NOTES THAT AUTOSEVOCOM RELIES ON THE BELGIAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM. UNCOVERED PHONE LINES, BOTH AUTOVON AND COMMERCIAL, PROVED TO BE USEFUL TO A DEGREE, ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION OF ISSUES WAS LIMITED FOR SECURITY REASONS. THIS SAME LIMITATION APPLIED TO CALLS TO WASHINGTON RESPONSE CELL THROUGH AMEMB BRUSSELS ON "LONDON TOLL". AS ONE TWO OF THESE LINES EXIST, THIS SYTEM MOST LIKELY WOULD BECOME SATURATED DURING A CRISIS. THE NORMAL STATE DEPARTMENT TELETYPE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IS NOT SUITABLE FOR REAL-TIME EXCHANGE OF VIEWS OR DISCUSSION OF ISSUES BECAUSE OF INHERENT TIME DELAYS IN EXCHANGING MESSAGES. THIS EXERCISE DEMONSTRATED THAT CURRENT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AT USNATO IS INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE MISSION WITH IMMEDIATE AND RELIABLE ACCESS TO THE WASHINGTON DECISION-MAKING LEVEL. IN A CRISIS, THIS SHORTCOMING WOULD SERIOUSLY LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO CONSULTATIVE AND COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES. A DEDICATED, SECURE, AND RELIABLE TELEPHONE LINK WITH WASHINGTON IS REQUIRED. MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS WILL FOLLOW IN SEPTTEL.

B. WASHINGTON PARTICIPATION. (1) AS DISCUSSED IN USNATO 716, HILEX-6 INVOLVED HIGH-LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN CAPITALS OF OTHER NATIONS WHICH OBVIOUSLY HAD ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION FROM ALL COGNIZANT AGENCIES. ALTHOUGH WASHINGTON PARTICIPANTS GAVE EXCELLENT SUPPORT, EXERCISE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE REALISTIC IF SOME INVOLVEMENT OF OFFICIALS AT VERY HIGH LEVEL HAD BEEN ARRANGED. IN THIS REGARD, FUTURE HILEX EXERCISES WOULD BE MORE PROFITABLE TO US IF COMBINED WITH A NATIONAL EXERCISE CORRESPONDING TO THE HILEX SCENARIO. WIDER WASHINGTON REPRESENTATION AT MEETINGS OF THE NATO HIGH-LEVEL EXERCISE PLANNING GROUP WOULD HAVE LED TO MORE BENEFICIAL WASHINGTON PARTICIPATION AND BROADER TESTING OF INTERNAL NATIONAL PROCEDURES.

(2) MISSION CONSIDERS THAT US PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPROVED WITH A 24-HOUR WASHINGTON RESPONSE CAPABILITY.

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C. IN ANY REAL WORLD CRISIS, MISSION WILL NEED CABLE OR WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION FROM WASHINGTON TO ACCEPT TELEPHONE GUIDANCE FROM ANY BUT MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS. NAMES OF WASHINGTON OFFICIALS AUTHORIZED TO TRANSMIT TELEPHONE GUIDANCE SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

3. WASHINGTON/NATO PROBLEMS. A. IN THE EARLY STAGES, MISSION NOTICED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING IN WASHINGTON OF THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM IN TWO AREAS. FIRST, DPC APPROVAL OF AN ALERT MEASURE FROM THE MNC'S ALERT SYSTEM (S1/72) DOES NOT NECESSARILY COMMIT NATIONS TO CARRY IT OUT AS THIS DEPENDS ON THE CATEGORY ASSIGNED TO THE MEASURE. SECONDLY, ALERT IMPLEMENTATION REPORTS (ALIMPREPS) SHOULD BE SENT TO NATO ADDRESSEES AS INDICATED IN S1/72, PART III, CHAPTER 3. HILEX-6 DISCLOSED SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE

NATO ALERT SYSTEM. MISSION WILL PROVIDE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN LATER SEPTEL.

B. CONCERNING NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES IN US FORCES ALERT STATUS, WASHINGTON DID NOT FOLLOW THE AUTOMATIC NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY STATE 249808. SINCE LAST OCTOBER, US MISSION IS SENSITIVE ON THIS MATTER BUT RECOGNIZES THAT IN AN EXERCISE SOME ARTIFICIALITIES ARE TOLERABLE.

C. FAMILIARITY WITH C-M(71)1 WAS ALSO LACKING. THIS DOCUMENT CONCERNS THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION, AND OTHER DATA WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. IT PROVIDES FORMATS, ADDRESSES, AND CIRCUITS TO BE USED. WASHINGTON USE OF THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NWCS) DURING THE EXERCISE WAS HAPHAZARD AND SOME TRAFFIC HAD TO BE INSERTED BY MISSION INTO NATO CHANNELS. IN THIS REGARD, WE REPEAT OUR RECOMMENDATION IN USNATO 1011 THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO INSTALLING ADDITIONAL WASHINGTON TERMINALS FOR THIS SYSTEM.

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4. NATO PROBLEMS. ALSO SOME MNC'S (ESPECIALLY CINCHAN) DID NOT PROPERLY ADDRESS REQUESTS TO THE DPC FOR APPROVAL TO DECLARE ALERT MEASURES OR IMPLEMENT OPERATION PLANS. IN ADDITION, ONE CAPITAL (COPENHAGEN) DID NOT PROPERLY ADDRESS A REQUEST FOR A NATO PRESENCE IN A CERTAIN AREA. ALL NATO CAPITALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS ADDRESSEES TO ENABLE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE TIMELY GUIDANCE TO THEIR NATO DELEGATIONS. THIS PROBLEM WAS IRONED OUT DURING LATTER PORTION OF EXERCISE BUT SHOULD APPEAR IN COUNCIL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISE COMMITTEE (COEC) REPORT TO EMPHASIZE CORRECT PROCEDURES.

B. DISTRIBUTION OF NATO DOCUMENTS AND MESSAGES WITHIN NATO HEADQUARTERS WAS SLOW. DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF HILEX-6, MISSION EXPERIENCED AN AVERAGE DELAY OF 3 HOURS AND

45 MINUTES IN OUR RECEIPT OF TRAFFIC FROM THE IS/IMS REGISTRY. WE NOTED SOME IMPROVEMENT DURING THE COURSE OF THE EXERCISE BUT WE STILL FOUND OURSELVES RECEIVING DPC AGENDAS, FOR EXAMPLE, ONLY SHORTLY BEFORE THE DPC MEETING ITSELF. AGAIN, THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN COEC REPORT.

C. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR NATO SECRET MATERIAL TO BE CONTINUOUSLY CONTROLLED AND TO HAVE ALL MOVEMENTS RECORDED PRESENTED AN UNACCEPTABLE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND DELAY DURING SECRET

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HILEX-6 A GREAT VOLUME OF THIS MATERIAL WAS HANDLED DURING THE EXERCISE; A SIMILAR VOLUME CAN BE EXPECTED TO OCCUR DURING AN ACTUAL CRISIS. THIS DELAY SHOULD BE NOTED IN THE COEC REPORT AND SUBSEQUENTLY ADDRESSED BY THE NATO SECURITY COMMITTEE. MISSION SECURITY OFFICER WILL DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM WITH US SECURITY AUTHORITIES AT A LATER DATE.

D. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS APPLY CONCERNING THE ROLE OF THE REINFORCED SCEPC IN A CRISIS/WAR SITUATION:

(1) THE COMMITTEE WILL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY IF NATIONS SEND SENIOR OFFICIALS TO NATO DELEGATIONS WHEN THE REINFORCED SENIOR COMMITTEE IS CALLED.

(2) IF THE SCEPC IS TO PLAY ITS PART IN ADVISING THE NAC/DPC IN A FAST MOVING CRISIS, THESE SENIOR OFFICIALS SHOULD BE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF NATIONAL PLANS AND POLICY AND SHOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS. THE US OFFICIALS PROVIDED TO THE REINFORCED SENIOR COMMITTEE WERE HIGH LEVEL, PARTICULARLY WELL QUALIFIED, AND A REAL ASSET DURING THE EXERCISE. OTHER NATIONS WERE NOT SO WELL REPRESENTED.

(3) CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE REINFORCED SENIOR COMMITTEE SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE COMMITTEE SINCE THE CHAIRMAN IN A REAL SITUATION WOULD BE NEEDED TO RUN HIS DIRECTORATE. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE IN HILEX-6.

(4) CONSULTANTS SHOULD BE USED IN A TALENT POOL AS IN THE US NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE (NDER). DURING HILEX-6 THREE LOCAL US SHIPPING EXPERTS ASSIGNED TO THE NATO CIVIL WARTIME AGENCY (NCWA)-DEFENSE SHIPPING AUTHORITY (DSA) ACTED AS CONSULTANTS TO US SCEPC REPS. THIS PRACTICE SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER NATIONS.

(5) THE CIVREP REPORT WAS EFFECTIVE IN PROVIDING AN OVERVIEW OF THE CIVIL SITUATION IN NATIONS. HOWEVER, THIS REPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DETAILED.

5. GENERAL. A. TWO OTHER CRISIS MANAGEMENT ASPECTS WERE OBSERVED DURING HILEX-6. THESE INVOLVE MACHINERY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF POLITICO/MILITARY ASSESSMENTS (USNATO 1013 REFERS),

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AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TRIAL COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM (USNATO 748 REFERS). COEC DRAFT EVALUATIONS WILL FOLLOW AND MISSION WILL SUGGEST MODIFICATIONS IN LIGHT OF OUR EXPERIENCE DURING THE EXERCISE. IN ADDITION SCEPC DRAFT EVALUATION OF EXERCISE WILL FOLLOW WITH MISSION COMMENTS.

B. THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF WILL REPAIR A DRAFT WORKING PAPER COVERING LESSONS LEARNED FROM HILEX-6. WE WILL FORWARD WHEN RECEIVED. PAPER WILL BE CONSIDER IN COEC FOR ULTIMATE APPROVAL BY DPC. IN THE MEANTIME, WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE EXERCISE AND ON THE FOREGOING WILL BE USEFUL TO USE IN UPCOMING COEC DISCUSSIONS OF EXERCISE. RUMSFELD

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